
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JAPAN-US: A MAJOR COMPLICATION HAS ARISEN IN THE OKINAWAN REVERSION NEGOTIATIONS.

TOKYO HAS INFORMED THE US THAT THE VOICE OF AMERICA EVOA; FACILITIES ON OKINAWA WILL HAVE TO BE REMOVED AFTER REVERSION. THE US HAD PREVIOUSLY INDICATED TO THE JAPANESE THAT IT PLACED THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE ON THE CONTINUATION OF THE VOA OPERATIONS.

A JAPANESE FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIAL INDICATED THAT PRIME MINISTER SATO AND FOREIGN MINISTER AICHI BEHIND THE MOVE, ACCORD-CONCURRED IN THE DECISION. TRADITIONAL SENSITIVITY ING TO THE OFFICIAL, WERE: AS WELL AS LEGAL PROHIBITIONS AGAINST FOREIGN BROAD-CASTING FROM JAPANESE SOIL; STRONG OPPOSITION WITHIN THE RULING CONSERVATIVE PARTY AS WELL AS FROM THE OPPOSITION PARTIES TO ANY ATTEMPT TO TRAM THROUGHT CHANGES IN THE BROADCAST LAWS: AND FEAR OF OFFENDING CHINA AT THIS PEDELICATED TIME. THE OFFICIAL CLAIMED THAT ALL OPTIONS HAD BEEN FULLY CONSIDERED, BUT THAT NO FORMULA COULD BE FOUND THAT WOULD NOT CREATE ''INSURMOUNTABLE'' DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROB-LEMS .

TOKYO'S STRONG STAND ON THIS ISSUE IS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF JAPAN'S GROWING SELF-ASSERTIVENESS IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE US. SATO CLEARLY FEELS THAT HE WOULD BE VULNERABLE POLITICALLY IF HE ACCEDED TO THE US WISHES, PARTICULARLY AT A TIME WHEN HE IS TRYING TO SHOW A FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO IMPROVING RELATIONS

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